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About the ReCAAP ISC

Information Sharing, Capacity Building and Cooperative Arrangements

“The ReCAAP initiative demonstrates the resolve of Asian Governments to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships, and exemplifies the type of regional cooperation on this important issue that the IMO has sought to cultivate wherever it may be necessary and appropriate. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre and its Members can be justifiably proud of their accomplishments during this first year of the Centre’s operation. Within the Agreement of Cooperation between IMO and the ReCAAP ISC, signed in December 2007, we look forward to continuing and strengthening our collaboration in the ongoing drive against piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Asian region.”

– Mr. Efthimios E. Mitropoulos
Secretary-General
International Maritime Organisation
The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a government-to-government agreement among Asian countries to prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. The Agreement was finalised on 11 November 2004 in Tokyo, and came into force on 4 September 2006. To date, fourteen countries have ratified the Agreement.

The fourteen Contracting Parties are People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.

The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) is an inter-governmental organisation established under the ReCAAP initiative to:

- serve as a platform for information exchange with the ReCAAP Focal Points through the Information Network System (IFN);
- conduct research and analysis of piracy and armed robbery incidents to foster better understanding of the situation in Asia; and
- facilitate capacity building efforts.

The ReCAAP ISC is based in Singapore and was officially launched on 29 November 2006.

The ReCAAP ISC is overseen by a Governing Council made up of one representative from each ReCAAP Contracting Party. The Governing Council meets at least once annually.
Foreword
Message by the Executive Director
Message by the Executive Director
“We encourage the community to join us in this effort against piracy and armed robbery in Asia, and enhance the safety of seafarers who are entrusted with the efficient movement of cargo that underpins the world economy.”

The ReCAAP ISC is part of a pioneering effort by Asian states to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. Since its establishment in November 2006, the ReCAAP ISC has worked hard to build its research capability which is the core of its mission.

The ReCAAP ISC hopes that its research and analysis will contribute towards a better understanding and awareness of the piracy and armed robbery situation in Asia, and in turn enable ReCAAP Focal Points and law enforcement agencies to focus their anti-piracy response efforts. Organising capacity-building programmes to improve the response and enforcement capabilities of ReCAAP members is also a priority of the ReCAAP ISC: the first capacity building workshop for ReCAAP Focal Points was conducted on 24-26 October 2007 in Singapore, and provided ReCAAP Focal Points with an opportunity to share best practices.

Over the past year, the ReCAAP ISC has engaged shipping associations, research institutions, and other organisations who share its interest in combating piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia. An Agreement of Cooperation was signed between the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the ReCAAP ISC on 4 December 2007, giving the ReCAAP ISC consultative status at the IMO. Such partnerships will enable the ReCAAP ISC to enhance its research capability, by exchanging ideas, sharing expertise, and co-operating with its partners through technical workshops and other capacity-building programmes.

Moving forward, the ReCAAP ISC will continue to reach out to all sectors of the maritime community. We encourage the maritime community to join us in this effort against piracy and armed robbery in Asia, and enhance the safety of seafarers who are entrusted with the efficient movement of cargo that underpins the world economy.

YOSHIKI ITO
Executive Director
Adding Value
The Information Sharing and Research Processes
THE VALUE CHAIN

- ReCAAP Focal Points
- Consultative Dialogues / Information Sharing
- ReCAAP SC Working Groups
- Operational Support
- Capacity Building
- Marine and Research Communities
The Information Sharing and Research Processes

“The ReCAAP ISC reports are very thorough, well-researched and contain data on attacks that have been perpetrated in the region. The analysis of the details of the attacks in the report provides for follow-up research as well as facilitates regional law enforcement agencies to take the necessary follow-up action.”

– LTC Joshua Ho
Senior Fellow
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
ADDING VALUE: THE INFORMATION SHARING AND RESEARCH PROCESSES AT THE RECAAP ISC

The aim of information sharing and research at the ReCAAP ISC is to provide a better understanding of the piracy and armed robbery situation in Asia. This includes undertaking a chain of activities that involves information collection and management, information processing and analysis, and information communication and dissemination.

INFORMATION COLLECTION AND MANAGEMENT

Information collection and management involves collating information on incidents of piracy and armed robbery from the ReCAAP Focal Points, and open source materials such as media reports and commentaries.

The ReCAAP Focal Points send information on incidents to the ReCAAP ISC through the Information Network System (IFN). The IFN is a secure web-based system that links the ReCAAP Focal Points to each other as well as to the ReCAAP ISC. It was developed at a cost of approximately USD 660,000, and operates on a 24/7 basis.

The format adopted for information sharing is in accordance with the International Maritime Organisation’s Maritime Safety Committee Circular 622 Rev.1 Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships.

The ReCAAP ISC manages the flow of information by assigning officers to cover particular areas in Asia. This allows the ReCAAP ISC to leverage the experience and local knowledge of officers seconded from the various ReCAAP Contracting Parties as well as local staff.

The ReCAAP Focal Points

Each state that is party to the ReCAAP has assigned a government agency to coordinate issues of piracy and armed robbery, and act as the point of contact with the ReCAAP ISC. The Focal Points of the ReCAAP Contracting Parties are:

- Bangladesh: Department of Shipping
- Brunei: Royal Brunei Marine Police
- Cambodia: Ministry of Public Works and Transport
- China: Beijing Maritime Search and Rescue Centre and Hong Kong Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (ReCAAP Contact Point)
- India: Indian Coast Guard
- Japan: Japan Coast Guard
- Korea: Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
- Laos: Ministry of Public Security
- Myanmar: Myanmar Navy
- Philippines: Philippine Coast Guard
- Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka Navy
- Singapore: Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore
- Thailand: Royal Thai Navy
- Vietnam: Vietnam Marine Police

Ships are strongly encouraged to report incidents of piracy and armed robbery to the authorities of the nearest coastal state, as recommended by the International Maritime Organisation’s MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3 Guidelines to shipowners and ship operators, shipmasters and crews on preventing and suppressing acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The authorities will manage the incident in accordance with their national guidelines and policies, and the various International Maritime Organisation guidelines such as MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1 Recommendations to Governments for preventing and suppressing piracy and armed robbery against ships. The authorities will then share details of reported incidents, as well as subsequent investigative details, with their respective ReCAAP Focal Points. The ReCAAP Focal Points will in turn file incident reports to the ReCAAP ISC and other ReCAAP Focal Points via the Information Network System (IFN).
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS

Analysis involves processing information through the use of conceptual tools for the purpose of adding value. To achieve this, the ReCAAP ISC has developed a classification system to categorise piracy and armed robbery incidents. This system classifies incidents according to the level of violence involved and economic loss incurred.

The definitions of piracy and armed robbery adopted by the ReCAAP ISC are in accordance with the ReCAAP Agreement, wherein:

**Piracy**, in accordance with Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is defined as:

(1) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(a) on the high seas, against another ship or persons or property on board such ship;
(b) against a ship, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(2) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

(3) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

**Armed Robbery** against ships, in accordance with the International Maritime Organisation’s Code of Practice for the Investigation of the Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, is defined as:

(1) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends and directed against a ship, or against persons or property on board such ship, in a place within a Contracting Party’s jurisdiction over such offences;

(2) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of facts making it a ship for armed robbery against ships;

(3) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraphs (1) or (2).

**Violence Factor.** This factor refers to the intensity of violence and threat faced by seafarers in an incident. The three indicators used to determine this are:

(1) **Types of weapons used**

Incidents where robbers/pirates board a ship with no visible weapons are generally considered less violent compared to cases where robbers/pirates are armed with pistols, knives, machetes, or other dangerous weapons. Incidents where more sophisticated weapons are used would be considered more violent.

(2) **Treatment of crew**

Incidents where robbers/pirates kill or kidnap crew are considered more violent compared to petty theft cases where robbers flee upon detection. Cases involving threats to members of the crew, assault, serious injury or death, are also considered more violent.

(3) **Number of pirates/robbers engaged in an attack**

As a rule, an incident involving a larger number of robbers/pirates is considered to have a higher potential for the use of force. A larger number of robbers/pirates may also indicate the involvement of gangs or organised syndicates, rather than petty and opportunistic pirates who generally operate in small groups.

**Economic Factor.** This factor takes into consideration the type of property stolen from the ship. Cases involving theft of cash or personal effects are generally less significant compared to cases where the entire ship is hijacked for either its cargo or the vessel itself.

Using these indicators, the ReCAAP ISC categorises incidents into one of three levels of significance. Category 1 incidents are considered **very significant**, Category 2 incidents are considered **moderately significant**, and Category 3 incidents are considered **less significant**.

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<th>CATEGORY</th>
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<td>CAT 3</td>
<td>Less Significant</td>
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After categorising reported incidents, the ReCAAP ISC analyses the information to identify patterns and trends. The ReCAAP ISC also highlights correlations between the significance of incidents and factors such as the status of targeted ships and the location of incidents.
In an effort to better understand local circumstances, the ReCAAP ISC carries out visits to ReCAAP Focal Points. Such visits include discussions with officers from law enforcement agencies to understand local challenges in managing and combating piracy and armed robbery against ships. These visits also serve to identify possible areas for capacity building. The most recent visit was to the port of Chittagong, Bangladesh, on 9-13 September 2007, to understand the factors that contributed to the decrease in the number of incidents reported at the port of Chittagong in the first half of 2007.

The ReCAAP ISC and the IMO’s Maritime Safety Division periodically update each other with information on piracy and armed robbery incidents. Informal consultative dialogues with various partner organisations are also held to share the ReCAAP ISC’s research findings and analysis. These dialogues provide the ReCAAP ISC’s partners with an opportunity to contribute towards its research and provide feedback on current and emerging patterns and trends. These partner organisations include industry bodies and research institutions such as the:

- Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO)
- International Independent Tanker Owners’ Organisation (INTERTANKO)
- International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (Intercargo)
- International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
- Asian Shipowners’ Forum (ASF)
- Singapore Shipping Association (SSA)

Mr. Yoshiaki Ito with Ms. Minerva Alfonso, Business Development Manager and Regional Manager for UK, INTERTANKO.

**INFORMATION COMMUNICATION AND DISSEMINATION**

The ReCAAP ISC publishes reports monthly. These reports contain information on piracy and armed robbery incidents reported in Asia, and analysis of the patterns and trends. They are disseminated to the ReCAAP Focal Points, the maritime community, research institutions, and other interested parties. They are also made available on the ReCAAP website (www.recaap.org).

The ReCAAP ISC and ReCAAP Focal Points regularly exchange confidential information on incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships reported in Asia. Where necessary, the ReCAAP ISC publishes incident alerts to inform ReCAAP Focal Points and the maritime community of significant incidents. These alerts can be used to inform ships of these incidents and advise them to adopt precautionary measures when operating in the vicinity of the incidents.

The ReCAAP ISC maintains a mailing list to notify interested parties of the latest reports. Interested parties are welcome to subscribe to the mailing list by sending a request to info@recaap.org.

“The efforts of the countries party to the ReCAAP agreement to work together is a fine example of the advantages achieved through regional cooperation. The positive results seen in the reduction of attacks to ships speak for themselves, and serve well as an incitement to countries in other regions with maritime security challenges to adopt the ReCAAP model.”

– Mr. Carsten Melchior

**Secretary-General**

Baltic and International Maritime Council
Charting Trends
Patterns and Trends of Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia (2003-2007)
Patterns and Trends of Piracy and Armed Robbery in Asia (2003-2007)

“The shipping industry finds the information on piracy and armed robbery against ships provided by the ReCAAP ISC helpful in undertaking precautionary measures against such attacks. We appreciate the contributions made by the ReCAAP ISC, and believe the ReCAAP ISC will continue to make a great contribution toward the maritime safety in the Asia region”

– Mr. Wang Cheng
Secretary-General
Asian Shipowners’ Forum
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There has been a significant improvement in the piracy and armed robbery situation in Asia with the largest yearly decrease in the number of reported incidents taking place in 2007. The decline in the number of reported incidents was most evident in the port of Chittagong, Bangladesh and the area around the Makassar Strait, Indonesia.

The greatest decrease from 2003 to 2007 took place in Category 2 (moderately significant) incidents. There was a slight increase in the number of Category 1 (very significant) incidents reported in 2007 compared to 2006. Of the five Category 1 incidents reported in 2007, three were hijackings, one involved kidnapping, and one involved a member of the crew being thrown overboard. The authorities apprehended the culprits involved in two out of the three hijacking incidents. In all three cases, the vessel was rescued and the hijacked ships recovered.

The incidents reported in 2007 were generally less violent compared to those in the previous four years: incidents involving assault or taking members of the crew hostage occurred less frequently in 2007 compared to the previous years. Tankers were involved in a larger portion of incidents in 2007 compared to previous years, when more bulk carriers were more frequently involved.

Of the incidents where losses were reported, theft of ship stores and engine spares appeared to be more common between 2005 and 2007 than in 2003 and 2004.

PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS HAS BEEN DECREASING OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS

One hundred piracy and armed robbery incidents were reported in Asia in 2007, of which 77 were actual and 23 were attempted incidents. In contrast, there were 135 incidents reported in 2006, of which 90 were actual and 35 attempted incidents. The number of incidents reported in 2007 decreased by 26% compared to 2006, the largest yearly decrease since 2003. During this five-year period, the number of piracy and armed robbery incidents was highest in 2003, when 210 incidents (153 actual and 57 attempted) were reported.

Most of the decrease in the total number of incidents in 2007 took place in Category 2 incidents. Compared to 2006, the number of Category 2 incidents reported in 2007 decreased by 63%, from 38 to 14 incidents. However, the number of Category 3 (less significant) incidents remained fairly consistent between 2006 and 2007.

PATTERNS OF INCIDENTS IN SOUTH ASIA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA (2003-2007)

Compared to the period 2003-2006, the most significant improvements in 2007 took place in the port of Chittagong, Bangladesh, and the area around the Makassar Strait in Indonesia. However, there was a slight increase in the number of incidents reported in India, and the ports and anchorages around the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

(Refer to the map on Location of all reported incidents (January - December 2007))
PORT OF CHITTAGONG, BANGLADESH (2003-2007)

There were 12 incidents reported in Chittagong in 2007. Of these, one was a Category 2 incident and 11 were Category 3 incidents. The downward trend in the number of incidents reported at the port of Chittagong can probably be attributed to efforts by the Bangladeshi authorities to enhance security. Please refer to the chapter entitled “Study Trip Report: the port of Chittagong, Bangladesh (9-13 September 2007)” for more details. There were a total of 32 incidents reported in Chittagong in 2003. The number of incidents reported in 2004 and 2005 decreased to 14 and 16 respectively. However, the number of incidents reported increased to 30 in 2006.

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MAKASSAR STRAIT AND SURROUNDING AREA, EAST KALIMANTAN, INDONESIA (2003-2007)

In 2007, seven incidents were reported in the Makassar Strait and the surrounding area. Of these, one was a Category 1 incident, one was a Category 2 incident and five were Category 3 incidents. The drop in the number of incidents off East Kalimantan may account for the drop in the number of incidents involving bulk carriers, as the ports and anchorages in these areas are mainly dry bulk facilities. There were seven incidents reported in this area in 2006, compared to a yearly average of 23 incidents during the period 2003-2005.

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This map is for illustrative purposes only. It does not contain all areas where piracy and armed robbery take place, and it may change over time. Please refer to the ReCAAP ISC reports for the latest information on incidents of piracy and armed robbery reported in Asia.

There were 10 incidents reported in 2007, of which one was a Category 2 incident and nine were Category 3 incidents. Of these 10 incidents, five were immediately reported to the nearest coastal state, i.e. India, enabling the Indian law enforcement authorities to respond. In two cases, the stolen items were recovered, and arrests were made in one case. In 2003, 19 incidents were reported in India. This decreased to 12 incidents in both 2004 and 2005, and three incidents in 2006.

In 2007, there were 20 incidents reported at the ports and anchorages around the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Of these, one was a Category 1 incident, four were Category 2 incidents, 14 were Category 3 incidents, and one was uncategorised due to lack of information. This was an increase in the number of incidents compared to 2005 and 2006, when 16 and 13 incidents were reported respectively. Although the littoral states’ coordinated patrols may have contributed to the decrease in incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, the number of incidents taking place closer to shore, in ports and at anchorages, has risen in some years during the period 2003-2007.
Types of ships targeted

Tankers were the type of ship most frequently involved in incidents in 2007. In contrast, bulk carriers were the most frequently targeted type of ships between 2003 and 2006. However, the type of ship targeted appears to depend more on the locations with a higher number of piracy and armed robbery incidents during the period under consideration, rather than the type of ship per se. The incidents involving bulk carriers between 2003 and 2006 occurred mostly within the stretch between Pulau Laut and Balikpapan in East Kalimantan, Indonesia, an area where most of the ports primarily handle dry bulk cargo. The decrease in the proportion of bulk carriers involved in incidents has declined with the decrease in the number of incidents reported in that region. In 2007, more than half of the 40 incidents involving tankers occurred at the Indonesian anchorages around Belawan and Dumai in Sumatra, and Balongan in Java, which are mainly oil and chemical facilities.

Observations on incidents reported in 2007 at anchorages and at berth

Incidents involving ships at anchorages and at berth were most frequently reported in the anchorage of Chittagong in Bangladesh, where there was one incident in each of these locations that deviated from the general characteristics of incidents involving ships at anchor or at berth as described above. At the ports of Belawan and Tanjung Priok, there was one case at each of these ports where robbers were slightly more disposed towards violence, instead of fleeing, when detected. One of the three robbers who boarded the chemical tanker Chem Jasmine on 26 June 2007 at the port of Belawan threatened a member of the crew with a knife upon detection. At Tanjung Priok, one of the robbers who boarded a container ship on 30 June 2007 attacked a member of the crew with an axe, severely injuring him. Both cases were classified as Category 2 incidents.

• Most incidents reported at the port of Chittagong in Bangladesh were usually opportunistic. However, some cases involved slightly larger groups of robbers, consisting of more than eight men. For example, the general cargo ship BBC Konan was boarded on 1 July 2007 in the port of Chittagong by a group of 14 men armed with knives. Two of the robbers involved in this incident were apprehended by the crew and handed over to the authorities.

• All the incidents that occurred at the ports of Dumai in Sumatra, Balongan in Java, Balikpapan in East Kalimantan, the anchorage of Vung Tau in Vietnam, and the port of Manila in the Philippines were typical along the characteristics highlighted above. In the incident at Balongan, one of the two robbers who boarded the tanker Kourion while she was at anchor on 9 September 2007 was apprehended by the crew and handed over to the Indonesian authorities. (The Kourion was also involved in two other Category 3 incidents in 2007, one at the port of Balongan on 19 January 2007, and the other at the port of Dumai on 22 March 2007).

• There was a group of eight robbers involved in the incident involving the product tanker Petrol mix 04 on 22 August 2007 at the anchorage of Karimun. In the case involving the tanker MT Onoz on 8 May 2007 at the anchorage of Visakhapatnam, India, there was a group of seven robbers involved in the incident. The Indian Coast Guard arrested four of the robbers and recovered the mooring rope that was stolen.

• There was a group of eight robbers involved in the incident involving the product tanker Petrol mix 04 on 22 August 2007 at the anchorage of Karimun. In the case involving the tanker MT Onoz on 8 May 2007 at the anchorage of Visakhapatnam, India, there was a group of seven robbers involved in the incident. The Indian Coast Guard arrested four of the robbers and recovered the mooring rope that was stolen.

Incidents involving ships under way

Significance Level

Incidents involving ships under way (or steaming) have generally been more significant, and were classified as either Category 1 or Category 2 incidents. In 2007, 11 of the 15 actual incidents involving ships under way were Category 1 and Category 2 incidents. In contrast to the incidents involving stationary ships, most of the incidents involving ships under way exhibited some degree of planning by the robbers or pirates, who appeared to be well-organised. Such incidents were usually carried out by larger groups consisting of more than six people. Typically, these groups approached their targets from potential blind spots such as the stern, in speedboats. Slow moving ships such as bulk carriers and tugs towing barges, as well as ships with low freeboards, were thus more frequently targeted, although, in some instances, the robbers or pirates possessed the skill and boldness to attempt boarding larger and faster vessels.

Violence and economic factors

The robbers or pirates operating in larger groups of more than six were usually armed with guns, and occasionally, more sophisticated weapons. There was an increase in the number of incidents which involved robbers or pirates armed with guns in 2006, compared to 2003-2005. However, this increase did not continue in 2007.

Upon boarding, the robbers either made their way to the ship master’s cabin and intimidated members of the crew into opening the safe, or stole cash and personal belongings before fleeing. Depending on the motivations of the robbers or pirates, they sometimes kidnapped members of the crew for ransom, or hijacked the ship.

Observations on incidents reported in 2007 involving ships under way

The ReCAAP ISC has the following observations regarding incidents involving ships attacked while under way in 2007:

• Ships targeted while steaming were generally smaller and slower moving vessels of less than 10,000 GT. These ships included small fishing vessels, small tankers, and tug boats and barges. Most attempts to board these ships were successful, and were Category 1 incidents.

• On some occasions, unsuccessful attempts were made to board slightly larger bulk carriers and container vessels, of 20,000-50,000 GT. These incidents took place in the more open waters of the Arabian Sea, the South China Sea, and the Makassar Strait, and were generally more sophisticated, with the robbers or pirates often approaching their targets from multiple directions in two or more speedboats. These attempts include those involving the bulk carrier Atlantic Breeze in the Arabian Sea on 13 April 2007, the bulk carrier Jasmine Ace in the Makassar Strait on 29 August 2007, and the container ship MV Ali Mutanabbi in the South China Sea on 27 November 2007.

• The incidents that took place in the area around the Sulu Sea and the southern area of the South China Sea, appear to have been perpetrated by highly motivated robbers or pirates. The robbers or pirates involved in these incidents were described as groups of masked men operating in larger groups, who did not hesitate to use their guns. The Ai Manu was boarded off Bintan on 14 March 2007 by a group of ten robbers, and a large group of more than 15 masked men attempted to board the Surus Putra 5 in the Sulu Sea on 9 May 2007. During the attempted boarding of the fishing vessel Hayu 908 on 26 July 2007 near the Anambas Islands, guns were fired to intimidate the crew, although the ship managed to prevent boarding by increasing her speed.
Incidents in 2007 involving hijacking and kidnapping

Hijackings and kidnappings have been relatively less frequent in 2006 and 2007 compared to 2003 - 2005. In 2007, there were a total of four incidents involving hijacking and kidnapping. All four were Category 1 incidents. These were:

- hijacking of the tanker *Ai Maru* off Bintan on 14 March 2007
- hijacking of the tanker *MT Kraton* in the Lingga Archipelago on 22 September 2007
- hijacking of the tug boat *Makmur Abadi-I*, which was towing the barge *Makmur Abadi-5* in the Makassar Strait on 23 December 2007
- incident of kidnapping on board the tug boat *Brantas 25*, which was towing the barge *Singa Besar 3* in the Straits of Malacca on 13 August 2007

All four incidents were undertaken by well-organised groups who were highly motivated and well-armed. The following observations are worth noting:

- All three groups of hijackers were armed with guns. The hijackers of the *Ai Maru* were carrying shotguns and rifles, and the hijackers of the *MT Kraton* possessed grenades as well as guns.
- Post-investigation reports revealed that the incidents involving the *MT Kraton* and the *Makmur Abadi-1*, which was towing the *Makmur Abadi-5*, were planned. In both cases, the hijackers had apparently targeted the cargoes of palm oil on board. The rise in the price of palm oil could have made ships carrying such cargo more lucrative targets for hijackers.
- In the case of the *Brantas 25*, which was towing the *Singa Besar 3*, the ten pirates appeared less interested in stealing the cargo of steel billets. The pirates kidnapped the ship master and the chief engineer before fleeing in their boat, and may not have known that the ship was carrying a valuable cargo, or may not have been able to discharge the cargo. It is likely that the slow speed of the tug boat and the barge contributed towards making them targets. On 27 August 2007, two weeks after the kidnapping, the master and chief engineer were released, reportedly after a ransom was paid.

In the cases of the *Ai Maru* and the *MT Kraton*, 10 to 14 hijackers were involved. In contrast, there were 7 to 10 hijackers involved in the cases of the *Brantas 25*, which was towing the *Singa Besar 3*, and the *Makmur Abadi-1*, which was towing the *Makmur Abadi-5*. Tug boats towing barges appear to be viewed as easier targets, as they require fewer hijackers to take control of the vessel.

### Treatment of crew in actual incidents (2003-2007)

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<tr>
<td>KIDNAPPED/ HIJACKED</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSAULTED/ HOSTAGE</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREATENED</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO INJURY OR NOT REPORTED</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL NUMBER OF ACTUAL INCIDENTS</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER INCIDENTS NOT CLASSIFIED AS ACTS OF PIRACY OR ARMED ROBBERY IN 2007**

In 2007, there were two incidents involving boarding which were shown by subsequent investigations not to be cases of piracy or armed robbery.

The first incident, involving the container ship *Sinar Merak*, occurred on 21 January 2007 near Pulau Berhala in the Strait of Malacca. Being suspicious of the fishing boats, the ship undertook evasive action, which resulted in a collision with one of the boats. Two unknown persons were subsequently found on board the ship, and were reported to the Singapore authorities upon the *Sinar Merak’s* arrival at Singapore for cargo operations. Investigations by the Singapore authorities identified the two men as Indonesian citizens who were survivors of the collision. The two men were subsequently repatriated to Batam by the ship’s agent.

The second incident involved the tanker *Eurydice* and occurred on 5 November 2007 while she was anchored at approximately 1.5nm off Tanjung Piai, Johor. An unarmed person was found on board the ship, and was handed over to the Malaysian authorities. Investigations revealed that the man was a Thai national who claimed that he had fallen off a Thai fishing vessel. The Malaysian authorities prosecuted the man under the Immigration Act.
Study Trip Report
Port of Chittagong, Bangladesh (9-13 September 2007)
Study Trip
Study Trip Report: Port of Chittagong, Bangladesh (9-13 September 2007)
Recent Measures by the Bangladeshi Authorities to Counter Armed Robbery Against Ships

Over the past few years, the Bangladeshi authorities have undertaken several initiatives to enhance security of the port of Chittagong and its surrounding waters, and reduce the incidence of actual and attempted armed robbery against ships.

At the national level, the Government of Bangladesh has established a committee to coordinate measures to enhance both land and maritime security. This committee is headed by the Director-General of the Department of Shipping, and consists of members from eleven different government organisations which are involved in security and port operations. This includes the Chittagong Port Facility Security Officer. At the local level, the Chittagong Port Authority has established a port security committee which monitors the security situation at all twelve port facilities. The port security committee holds regular coordination meetings with ship owners, agents and other stakeholders, to improve the safety of the seafarers.

In an effort to reduce the number of small boats operating near larger merchant ships, fishing has been prohibited at the port’s anchorages. Measures to regulate the movement of small craft have also been introduced. These involved restricting the number of small craft allowed to operate in the anchorage areas, and allocating identification numbers and coloured markings to those small craft authorised to operate in these areas.

The law enforcement and security agencies have also stepped up their presence around the port. The Bangladesh Coast Guard has established a forward operating base at the mouth of the Karnaphuli river, to provide quick response to ships in need of assistance. River patrols conducted by the Chittagong Port Authority and the Bangladesh Coast Guard provide waterfront security along the river, and the Chittagong Port Authority has made additional patrol boats available to the Bangladesh Coast Guard, in order to maintain regular patrols in the area.

Overview of the Port of Chittagong

The port of Chittagong is the principal port of Bangladesh, and is located on the bank of the Karnaphuli river, approximately nine nautical miles from the shoreline of the Bay of Bengal. It has facilities for handling general cargo and containers, and specialised berths for bulk handling of oil, grain and cement clinker. About 90% of Bangladesh’s maritime exports are handled by the port of Chittagong. The port is run by the Chittagong Port Authority, a government organisation under the Ministry of Shipping.

The area surrounding the port of Chittagong is inhabited by people who mostly derive their livelihood from the sea. Barter trading with seafarers and ship breaking are major forms of local economic activity. Small boats which barter fresh provisions such as fish and vegetables in exchange for various items, including ship scrap, are a common feature at the port of Chittagong. Robbers have been known to exploit this situation by using the pretext of barter to board ships, and items stolen from ships are sold at the recycling market. The presence of many small unregulated boats also serves as cover for the robbers. These challenges are compounded by the fact that the security of the port is handled by several different agencies with limited resources.

Location: Latitude 22° 20’N; Longitude 91° 50’E
Principal Facilities: Bunkers, containers, dry dock, general cargo, petroleum, other liquid bulk, ro-ro, towage, dry bulk

A study trip to the port of Chittagong was arranged as part of the ReCAAP ISC’s effort to better understand the local factors affecting the incidence of piracy and armed robbery in Bangladesh, and identify areas for capacity building. The trip also provided the ReCAAP ISC with an opportunity to observe and discuss the measures taken by the Bangladeshi law enforcement agencies to address the issue of piracy and armed robbery against ships.
Recommendations

Recommendations and Measures to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships
Recommendations and measures to counter piracy and armed robbery against ships

“The issue of piracy and armed robbery is a matter of great concern and has been a recurring theme on the agenda of the INTERTANKO in recent years. We believe that an effective response can be achieved with cooperation and mutual coordination with governments and law enforcement agencies. The establishment of the ReCAAP ISC is a significant step towards achieving this objective. We thank ReCAAP for its efforts, and look forward to future initiatives that contribute towards a safer environment for our ships and their crew.”

– Ms. Minerva Alfonso
UK Regional Manager
International Independent Tanker Owners’ Organisation
Identifying patterns and trends of piracy and armed robbery as well as the methods used by perpetrators of these incidents allows stakeholders to understand the risk posed by attacks against ships. In this regard, stakeholders can undertake various measures to reduce the risk and the frequency of incidents of piracy and armed robbery.

**THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION**

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is a specialised agency of the United Nations which is responsible for recommending measures to improve the safety and security of international shipping and to prevent marine pollution from ships. The Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), a technical body at the IMO, urges Governments and the international shipping community to take all measures necessary to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships in or adjacent to their waters, including strengthening their respective security measures. These recommendations have been issued in the form of various MSC circulars and guidelines to Governments and the international shipping community. These circulars and guidelines include the following:

**MSC/Circ.622/Rev.1**

**MSC/Circ.623/Rev.3**

**MSC/Circ.967**
Piracy and armed robbery against ships: Directives for Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centres (MRCCs) ([http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=870/967.pdf](http://www.imo.org/includes/blastData.asp/doc_id=870/967.pdf)).

**MSC/Circ.984**

**MSC/Circ.1073**

The ReCAAP ISC strongly supports these circulars, and emphasises the importance of adopting measures that are consistent with these guidelines.

**RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE RECAAP ISC ON PRECAUTIONARY AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES AGAINST PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY**

**Recommendations to ship masters, Ship Security Officers and Company Security Officers**

**Update on risk areas**

The patterns and trends of piracy and armed robbery change over time. Ship masters are well advised to remain current on these trends through available sources such as the ReCAAP ISC reports, maritime circulars and information from the various industry associations. Company Security Officers should ensure that ships are kept informed of incidents that have occurred in their areas of operation.

**Maintaining a comprehensive ship security plan, including counter-boarding plan**

Ship masters and ship security officers are responsible for formulating a ship security plan, and ensuring that all members of the crew are aware of their respective responsibilities that are outlined in the plan. The ReCAAP ISC strongly advises ship security officers to incorporate a counter-boarding plan into the ship security plan.

Ship masters should ensure all training requirements are met, with the crew trained to react consistently in accordance to the plan. Ship masters are also encouraged to remind seafarers of the communication systems, alarm signals and procedures in counter-piracy plan before entering high risk areas. Special attention should be given to new seafarers and seafarers who may not be familiar with the working language of the ship. Ship managers and Company Security Officers should appropriately screen the crew before deploying them on board ships.
Indication of a ship’s preparedness and effectiveness in implementing a counter-boarding plan could deter pirates/armed robbers.

The need for enhanced watch keeping, and use of lighting and surveillance

Early detection of a possible attack is the most effective deterrent, and reduces risk to the crew. It provides the crew an opportunity to sound the alarm, alert other ships and the coastal authorities, and undertake countermeasures and other response procedures.

When anchored or berthed at risk areas, the ReCAAP ISC advises ship masters to strengthen watch keeping if possible. Regular deck patrols by sufficient members of the crew who are equipped with two-way radios should be conducted. These patrols should focus on vulnerable areas of the ship such as the stern, the low freeboard areas, the hawse pipe/hole, the anchor chain and chain locker. Patrols should be staggered at unpredictable and irregular intervals to prevent attackers from deciphering the routine. Lighting should be sufficient at night. It is often the case that ships have poor lighting which would increase their vulnerability at night. Ship owners and ship managers are advised to provide proper lighting on the deck of the ship for the crew. Spot lights may effectively blind approaching attackers.

Ships carrying valuable cargo are also advised to limit circulation of cargo manifests as knowledge of this may lead attackers to select their target. When at berth, control entry points to prevent stowaways as they may assist personnel to board the ship when it is under way. Pilot ladders and ramps should be raised when not in use, and access to the accommodation, stores, cabin doors and openings should be secured.

When under way, ship masters should monitor all maritime safety information broadcasts for the area. In risk areas, ship masters should also maintain radar and visual watch for craft that may be trailing the ship at a similar speed with a course parallel or following the ship. These craft may close in to the ship quickly. In open areas, they usually operate in groups, and near a mother ship. Ship masters are advised to upgrade to a higher ISPS level, maintain all round watch, and be wary of other small craft that may approach unnoticed from potential blind spots. The ReCAAP ISC does not advocate the use of full lighting while the ship is under way at night or other lighting procedures that contravene the IMO’s Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs).

Crew responses if a potential attack is detected or an attack is imminent

If boarding by armed robbers is detected or imminent while at anchor or at berth, the ReCAAP ISC strongly advocates informing the port authorities or the nearest coastal state immediately. Immediate reporting may permit authorities to assist ship masters. The crew should subsequently adopt countermeasures such as raising all alarm signals, mustering themselves and other measures put forward in the counter-boarding plan.

The use of water hoses can generally be considered in port areas where attackers do not usually possess firearms. Highly pressurised water hoses have deterred attacks. However, the ReCAAP ISC cautions against using such measures in areas where attackers are more likely to possess firearms. Such measures may antagonise the attackers, causing them to inflict harm on members of the crew. In most cases, the adoption of basic countermeasures are sufficient in repelling opportunistic attackers who operate in anchorages and berth.

Attacks against ships that are under way are usually either planned or undertaken by criminals who are more aggressive and possess firearms. In open areas and on the high seas, ship masters may consider “riding off” such attackers with bold movements when approached. The effect of the bow wave and wash may deter attackers, and make it more difficult for them to attach poles or grapnels to the ship. Such manoeuvres must not be used in congested areas or close inshore or by ships constrained by draught. In such attacks, it is imperative for ship masters to contact the nearest Rescue Coordination Centres (RCC) for assistance as the authorities may be able to provide assistance. Attackers usually monitor radio signals.

If attackers manage to board the ship in spite of these attempts, it is imperative that the crew remains calm while the ship master persuades the attackers to allow members of the crew to retain control of the ship and negotiates a quick departure from the attackers. The Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) should be activated covertly as soon as possible, and in accordance with the Ship Security Plan procedures. The Company Security Officer must alert the relevant authorities such as the flag state immediately.

Reporting procedures after an actual or attempted attack

A report must be made to the nearest RCC, coastal or port state authorities, whichever appropriate, immediately after an actual or attempted attack. The report should include details of the identity and location of the ship at the time of the attack, injuries to the crew and damages (if any), number
and description of attackers, and the items stolen (if any). Where possible, the report should also highlight peculiarities or distinguishing features of the attackers, and other evidence such as CCTV footage or photographs taken that may aid investigation by the authorities. Such reports should also be sent to the ship’s maritime administration as soon as possible.

In cases where the crew apprehends an attacker, it is imperative to detain the attacker in secure confinement and provide basic care. Arrangements should be made to transfer apprehended attackers to law enforcement authorities.

**Recommendations to industry associations**

International and local industry-based organisations are a vital links between governments and ship owners. They play an important role in supporting IMO initiatives, providing guidance that is consistent with these initiatives, and channelling feedback. Industry associations can ensure that incidents of piracy and armed robbery are brought to the attention of the appropriate local, regional and international bodies. Awareness of such activities will encourage discussions that can foster efforts to identify timely and effective solutions.

Industry associations can also promulgate information on incidents of piracy and armed robbery to their members to promote awareness by producing guidelines, and conducting courses and seminars on maritime safety issues. For example, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) has published a manual entitled “The Ship Master’s Security Manual”, and the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Shipping Federation (ISF) have published a guidebook titled “Pirates and Armed Robbers: a Master’s Guide”. Such publications are useful to the shipping community in promulgating awareness.

“The ReCAAP ISC reports are very useful. We frequently use these reports to help us update our member companies on international security trends and patterns. I look forward to receiving your reports in 2008 and wish you well in your important work.”

– Mr. Arild Wegener

Director

Norwegian Shipowners’ Association
Appendix: Summary of incidents highlighted in the report

Incident involving the *Ai Maru* on 14 March 2007 at about 30 nm east of Pulau Bintan, [Riau Archipelago], Indonesia (Category 1 Incident)

Two speed boats with ten robbers intercepted the tanker. The robbers, who were wearing camouflage attire and black caps, were armed with shotguns, rifles and daggers. A member of the crew activated the AIS alert system and issued a distress call when the robbers boarded the tanker. The robbers demanded that the crew comply with their orders at gunpoint. They tied up the crew with ropes and blindfolded them with black cloth. The master of the ship was punched several times but sustained no serious injuries. The robbers took control of the tanker and ordered the master to sail southwest towards the Merapas Island. After steaming for about 45 minutes, the robbers damaged the ship’s communications equipment, and took the ship’s documents, crew’s passports, seaman books, cash and mobile phones. After sailing for another 15 minutes, the ship’s engines stalled. When the robbers could not restart the engines, they abandoned the tanker and escaped in their speed boats. The crew subsequently freed themselves.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Singapore). Additional details were also provided by the shipping agent.

Incident involving the *Al Mutanabbi* on 27 November 2007 in the South China Sea (Attempted Incident)

The container ship was steaming through the South China Sea at approximately 06° 46.0’ N 107° 50.0’ E when two small blue wooden boats were spotted about 4nm on the starboard side of the ship. The two blue wooden boats appeared to be moving on a course that would narrowly cross the *MV Al Mutanabbi*’s bow. The boats were about six to eight metres long and powered by outboard motors. A total of five men were on board these two boats.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Vietnam).

Incident involving the *Atlantic Breeze* on 13 April 2007 in the Arabian Sea (Attempted Incident)

A speed boat travelling at 20kts was sighted at a distance of about 8nm from the bulk carrier. The crew of the bulk carrier undertook anti-piracy measures. The suspicious boat closed in at a distance of 2nm to the bulk carrier. It later aborted the chase, and headed towards the African coast.

This incident was reported in the monthly report of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

Incident involving the *BBC Konan* on 1 July 2007 at the port of Chittagong, Bangladesh (Category 2 Incident)

Fourteen robbers armed with long knives and steel bars boarded the cargo ship while it was anchored. The ship master raised the alarm, mustered the crew and closed all access doors. He fired rocket flares into the air, raised the anchor and proceeded at full speed towards the open sea. The crew caught two robbers on the ship. The other robbers jumped overboard and escaped in their speedboats with the ship’s stores. The ship master reported the incident to the Bangladesh Coast Guard and Chittagong Port Authority. A coast guard patrol boat arrived at the location of the incident and brought the two robbers back to the local police for interrogation.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Bangladesh).

Kidnap of ship master and chief engineer from the *Brantas 25* and the *Singa Besar 3* on 13 August 2007 in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Category 1 Incident)

Ten robbers armed with guns boarded the tug boat *Brantas 25* while it was under way from the port of Penang to the port of Belawan. The robbers boarded the tug which was towing a barge laden with steel billets at approximately
30nm north-east of Belawan. Upon boarding, the robbers destroyed all communications equipment, stole the crew’s personal belongings and the ship’s documents, and abducted the ship master and the chief engineer before fleeing in their boat. The crew continued their journey to the port of Belawan and reported the incident to the Indonesian authorities who investigated the incident. The robbers released the ship master and the chief engineer on 27 August 2007 reportedly after a ransom was paid.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Singapore). Details of the release of the two crew members were reported by the Associated Press, 27 August 2007.

Incident involving the Eurydice on 5 November 2007 in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. (Incident not classified as an act of piracy or armed robbery)

A man suspected to be a robber was apprehended by the crew on board the oil tanker. The suspect was about 25 years of age, unarmed, and was believed to have boarded the ship from its hawse pipe. The Malaysian authorities investigated the incident and apprehended the suspect. The initial investigation by the Malaysian authorities revealed that the suspect was a Thai national and was reportedly carrying a tube of toothpaste and a toothbrush. The suspect claimed that he had fallen off from a Thai fishing vessel. The Malaysian authorities prosecuted the man under the Immigration Act for not having valid documents.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Singapore). Additional details were provided by the Malaysian authorities.

Incident involving the Huyu 908 on 26 July 2007 in the South China Sea (Attempted Incident)

While under way at approximately 40nm west of the Anambas Islands, the Chinese fishing vessel the Huyu 908 was approached by a small rubber boat. Five men armed with guns on board the rubber boat shot at the fishing vessel and attempted to board her. The fishing vessel increased speed and managed to escape. The bullets penetrated the starboard hull of the Huyu 908’s bridge and damaged three pieces of glass. No one was injured.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (China) and the ReCAAP Focal Point (Singapore).

Incident involving the Jasmine Ace on 29 August 2007 in the Makassar Strait, East Kalimantan (Attempted Incident)

The bulk carrier was sailing at approximately 17kts when it was approached by three white speedboats from its port and starboard side. The duty officer raised the alarm, sounded the ship’s whistle and mustered the crew. The boats aborted their attempt.

This incident was reported in the monthly report of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

Hijacking of the Makmur Abadi-1 and the Makmur Abadi-V on 23 December 2007 in the Makassar Strait, East Kalimantan (Category 1 Incident)

Seven men armed with sharp weapons boarded the tug boat and barge which was under way from Tanjung Redep in East Kalimantan to Surabaya in Indonesia with a cargo of palm oil. Upon boarding the tug boat, the hijackers overpowered the ship master and the crew. The ship master and the crew were tied up and locked in a room on board the tug boat. Subsequently, the tug boat was reportedly repainted black and its name changed to Ocean Line-1 and the name of the barge to Ocean Line-2. The tug boat and barge were steered toward the port of Labuan in Malaysia. The KRI Sutedi Senaputera, an Indonesian Navy ship that was patrolling in the Ambalat region, successfully intercepted the tug boat and the barge. The hijackers were arrested and taken to the Tarakan naval base in East Kalimantan, together with the tug boat and barge.

The details of this incident were reported by the Indonesian Navy (http://www.tniad.mil.id/tabid/61/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/340/Default.aspx). Additional details were provided by the Indonesian authorities.

Incident involving the MT Onozo on 8 May 2007 at the Visakhapatnam Anchorage, India (Category 2 Incident)

Seven robbers armed with knives boarded the Liberian-registered tanker at anchor via the poop deck. The duty crew
notified the bridge and all crew went into the accommodation quarters and locked all doors. The master raised the alarm, activated the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) and informed both the port control and local agent. The robbers jumped overboard and escaped with ship stores. No crew member was injured. The Indian authorities arrested four persons and recovered the mooring rope. The case is under investigation by the Indian authorities.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (India).

Incident involving the *MT Kraton* on 22 September 2007 in the Lingga Archipelago, Indonesia (Category 1 incident)

The *MT Kraton* was boarded by a group of fourteen hijackers approximately 40nm south-east of Bintan island. The hijackers were armed with four pistols, one grenade, seven parangs and three daggers. The ship master activated the ship’s security alarm system (SSAS) and informed the pilot station at Tanjung Buyot, Palembang of the boarding. The incident was reported to the authorities of the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. A coordinated response to the incident was undertaken, with assistance from the ship owner who was tracking the ship through the ship tracking system. On 24 September 2007, the authorities spotted the ship at approximately 2nm off Tanjung Ayam. The hijackers had changed the name of the ship from *MT Kraton* to *Ratu* to disguise her. An operation to detain the ship and rescue the crew was undertaken. The operation led to the rescue of all 17 members of the crew and the arrest of all fourteen hijackers. The hijacking was planned before the ship departed the port of Palembang. The hijackers planned to deliver the ship to a location in Malaysia based on instructions given via a satellite phone from buyers supposedly interested in the cargo of vegetable oil. The plan also included flight arrangements for the hijackers to return to Palembang from Batam after the incident.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Singapore). Additional details were provided by the Indonesian and Malaysian authorities.

Incident involving a container ship (name not known) on 30 June 2007 at Tanjung Priok, Indonesia (Category 2 Incident)

Six armed robbers from two boats boarded the container ship from her port and starboard quarters. They hit the duty crew member’s head with an axe causing severe bleeding. The ship master raised the alarm and mustered the crew. The robbers stole the ship’s stores and escaped. The ship master informed the pilot and the local agent of the incident. The injured member of the crew was taken ashore for medical treatment.

The incident was reported in the monthly report of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

Incident involving the *Petrolimex 04* on 22 August 2007 at the Karimun Anchorage, Riau Archipelago, Indonesia (Category 2 Incident)

Eight robbers armed with knives boarded the product tanker. The robbers tied up three members of the duty crew before breaking into the engine store to steal engine spares. The duty officer raised the alarm and mustered the remaining members of the crew. Upon hearing the alarm, the robbers jumped overboard and fled in an unlit boat.

The incident was reported in the monthly report of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

Incident involving the *Sinar Merak* on 21 January 2007 in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Incident not classified as an act of piracy or armed robbery)

Several unlit fishing boats approached *Sinar Merak* while under way. Suspecting it to be an attempt to board the ship, the master increased speed and started taking evasive action by altering his course. As a result, one of the boats hit the starboard bow of the ship. The emergency alarm was raised and a search carried out. Two persons were found on board the *Sinar Merak*. They were not armed or violent. The master continued his passage towards Singapore with the two men on board, and on arrival at Singapore, the security agencies boarded the vessel to carry out preliminary investigations. Upon establishing that the 2 men were actually survivors of the collision, the Indonesian Embassy in Singapore was informed. The 2 men were repatriated to Batam by ferry a few days later.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Singapore).
Incident involving the *Surya Putra 5* and the *Surya Cackra 5* on 9 May 2007 in the Sulu Sea, Philippines. (Attempted Incident)

A speedboat carrying fifteen armed men wearing face masks approached the tug boat and barge. The speedboat came within a distance of about 150m from the tug boat before stopping apparently due to engine problems. Both the tug boat and the barge managed to escape.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Philippines).

Incident involving the *Kourion* on 19 January 2007 at the Balongan Terminal, Java, Indonesia (Category 3 Incident)

Two robbers armed with steel bars boarded the oil tanker, and entered the engine room. They stole generator spares and escaped through the engine room door leading to the poop deck. The Master raised the alarm, mustered the crew and informed the local police.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Singapore).

Incident involving the *Kourion* on 22 March 2007 at the Dumai Terminal, Sumatra, Indonesia (Category 3 Incident)

Three robbers, who were armed with knives, boarded from the port quarter, and entered the accommodation. The master raised the alarm, alerted the crew and informed the authorities. A search was conducted but nothing was found missing.

The incident was reported in the monthly report of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).

Incident involving the *Kourion* on 9 September 2007 at the Balongan Terminal, Indonesia (Category 3 Incident)

Two robbers boarded the *Kourion* from a boat while she was anchored in the anchorage of Balongan. The robbers boarded the tanker from a boat, and broke into the store to steal some of the ship's property. While the robbers were in the ship's store, the boat used by the robbers to board the tanker drifted away with the current due to engine failure. This prevented the robbers from fleeing with the ship's property. The ship's crew raised the alarm and confronted the robbers. In an attempt to escape, the two robbers jumped overboard but were unable to board their boat which had drifted away. One robber held onto the ballast overboard discharge on the starboard side of the tanker. The crew gathered on deck and rescued the robber who was holding onto the ballast. The Indonesian authorities were informed of the incident. They boarded the ship for investigations and arrested the robber who was rescued by the crew. The authorities managed to locate the boat that was adrift but were unable to find the second robber. There were no injuries sustained by the crew and no items were stolen.

The incident was reported to the ReCAAP ISC by the ReCAAP Focal Point (Singapore). Additional details were provided by the ship owner.

Incident involving the *Chem Jasmin* on 26 June 2007 at the Belawan Outer Anchorage, Sumatra, Indonesia (Category 2 Incident)

The duty crew spotted three robbers trying to open the forward locker of the chemical tanker. He informed the officer-on-watch and ran forward. One of the robbers saw him, threatened him with a knife and chased him back to the accommodation quarters. The officer raised the alarm and mustered the crew members. The robbers stole the ship's property and escaped in a small boat. The ship master informed the port control authorities. There were no injuries sustained by the crew.

The incident was reported in the monthly report of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
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- International Chamber of Commerce – International Maritime Bureau (ICC-IMB)
- International Chamber of Shipping (ICS)
- International Independent Tanker Owners’ Organisation (INTERTANKO)
- International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
- Norwegian Shipowners’ Association
- NYK South Asia Pte Ltd
- S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) at the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore