



**Special Report
on
Incidents of Siphoning of Fuel/Oil
at Sea in Asia**

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SR 01/2014

Incidents of Siphoning of Fuel/Oil at Sea in Asia

Background


1. The trend of incidents involving siphoning of fuel/oil from product and oil tankers at sea is not new. Statistics for Jan - Jul of 2014 reveal that the occurrence of such incidents took place more frequently compared to the annual numbers reported in the past three years (2011-2013). Attributing to the surge in the number of incidents are various factors, including the market price of fuel/oil, the demand for fuel/oil in underground markets, the absence of authorities in locations where the siphoning occurred which in most instances, were outside areas of jurisdiction.

Objectives

2 The objectives of this report are: to provide an update on incidents involving siphoning of fuel/oil during 2011-2014 (up to mid-July 2014), to share the modus operandi of pirates/robbers involved in these incidents, to promote best practices and share lessons learned through case studies, and to recommend appropriate countermeasures to be adopted by authorities and shipping industry collectively.

Incidents involving siphoning of fuel/oil (2011-2014)


3. Graph 1 show the total number of reported incidents occurred in Asia during 2011-2014 (both successful and unsuccessful cases). Refer to Annex A on list of incidents.



Number of Siphoning Incidents (Successful vs Unsuccessful) (2011- mid Jul 2014)



4. Between 2011 and Jul 2014, a total of 16 incidents of siphoning of fuel/oil were reported, of which 11 incidents of siphoning were successfully carried out. The other five incidents were foiled because of timely intervention by enforcement agencies arising from timely reporting of the incidents to the ReCAAP ISC or the authorities who triggered the relevant agencies to promptly respond to the incident. In other unsuccessful cases, the crew exercised enhanced vigilance by triggering the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), or reporting the incident to vessels in the vicinity immediately. Of the 11 successful incidents of siphoning reported during 2011-2014, one occurred in 2011, one in 2012, two in 2013 and seven in 2014. See map below.



Location of Siphoning Incidents (successful and unsuccessful) during 2011- mid July 2014

Location of incidents

5. Notably, majority of the incidents occurred in the South China Sea (SCS). Of the 11 incidents reported during 2011-Jul 2014, seven occurred in the SCS, two in Indonesia, one in Malaysia and one in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS). The SCS was far away from shore, and outside the area of jurisdiction of regional authorities who would require more time to arrive at the location of the incident. This worked in favour of the pirates who could 'buy time' in carrying out their siphoning activities, and escaped before the arrival of the authorities.



6. Of the seven incidents reported in the SCS, one occurred in 2013 and six in 2014. The incidents involved *Danai 4* (10 Oct 13), *Sri Phangnga* (17 Apr 14), *Orapin 4* (28 May 14), *Budi Mesra Dua* (7 Jun 14), *Ai Maru* (14 Jun 14), *Moresby 9* (4 Jul 13) and *Oriental Glory* (15 Jul 14).

7. Of the other four incidents, two occurred in Indonesian waters in 2011 and 2012 involving *Namse Bang Dzod* while underway northeast of Surabaya on 15 Apr 11, and *Yunita* while anchored at Muara Berau anchorage, Samarinda, East Kalimantan on 11 Nov 12. One incident occurred off Port Klang, Malaysia involving *Naniwa Maru No. 1* while underway from Singapore to Port of Yangon, Myanmar on 22 Apr 14, and one incident occurred in the Malacca Strait involving *GPT 21* at approximately 6.8 nm west of Pulau Kukup, Malaysia on 7 Nov 13.

Time of Incident

8. Of the 16 incidents, 13 occurred during hours of darkness (between 1935 hrs and 0530 hrs), while three incidents occurred during daylight hours (between 1120 hrs and 1700 hrs). While time and location are considered as main factors in the success of any planned activities, the ReCAAP ISC notes that there was no correlation between time of incident and the location of boarding.

Modus Operandi of Pirates/Robbers (2011-Jul 2014)

9. By and large, the pirates/robbers adopted quite similar modus operandi in terms of the composition of the pirate/robber group, the treatment of crew, the weapons used and the modes of boarding. Most groups comprised not less than five, the highest being 16 men in the incident involving *Sri Phangnga*. Of the 16 incidents, eight of them reported that the pirates/robbers were armed with handguns or pistols and knives or parangs (long knives). Except in the case involving *Zafirah* in 2012 where the crew were abandoned into a life raft, and *Sri Phangnga* where the master suffered minor injuries, the crew in the other incidents were not harmed. However, they were threatened, tied and locked up. In majority of the reported incidents, the pirates/robbers boarded the tankers while underway, tied the crew and locked them in the cabin, took over control of the tankers and transferred the oil/fuel to another tanker or barge that would come alongside.

10. In the incident involving *Scorpio*, a Kiribati registered tanker, the robbers impersonated as crew of *Scorpio* in selling the MFO onboard to other tankers. While at anchor, the robbers boarded *Scorpio*, tied the crew and ordered the master to weigh anchor and proceed to another location when another tanker *Sea Jade* came alongside *Scorpio*. A crew of *Scorpio* was ordered to assist in the transfer of the MFO from *Scorpio* to *Sea Jade* while the other 11 crew was locked up inside the tanker's mess room.



11. Of the 16 incidents, three tankers had their names repainted over and renamed to mask their identities while siphoning was carried out. They were chemical tanker, *Zafirah* which was reportedly renamed to 'MT SEAHORSE' and her IMO number changed from '9016387' to '9016081', *Danai 4* renamed *DAN*; and *Orapin 4* renamed *RAPI*.

Economic Losses

12. Due to the high market price and taxes imposed on fuel/oil, illegal siphoning has been a lucrative business. So long there are demands for fuel/oil in underground markets, siphoning incidents would occur unless a holistic approach is adopted to tackle the problem by the authorities and the shipping industry collectively. Between 2011 and Jul 2014, incidents whose amount of fuel/oil lost were reported and tabulated in Annex B.

Factors Contributed to Failure in Siphoning of Fuel/Oil

13. Of the five unsuccessful incidents of siphoning of fuel/oil, three occurred in 2012 involving *Ai Maru* on 5 Jun 12, *Scorpio* on 13 Sep 12 and *Zafirah* on 19 Nov 12; one occurred in 2013 involving *Moresby 9* on 17 Aug 13, and one occurred in 2014 involving *New Glory* on 25 May 14. Among the factors that contribute towards these unsuccessful attempts in siphoning the fuel/oil onboard are: (a) vigilance of the crew to activate the SSAS and alert other vessels in the area; (b) timely reporting of the incident to the ReCAAP ISC and the authorities, (c) ReCAAP ISC's prompt circulation of **Incident Alerts** to inform and warn Mariners about the incidents; (d) ReCAAP ISC's operational coordination with the ReCAAP Focal Points, Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and the regional authorities in response to the incident, and lastly, (e) the speedy follow-up action by the authorities.

14. Incidents involving *Scorpio* and *Moresby 9* were foiled by the timely intervention of MMEA. In both cases, the robbers fled when sighting the MMEA patrol boats in the area. Almost 750 metric tons of MFO had been siphoned from *Scorpio* to tanker, *Sea Jade* when the MMEA patrol boat arrived and the six robbers fled in their speed boat leaving behind six long knives and *Sea Jade*. In the incident involving *Moresby 9*, 10 robbers boarded the product tanker at about 1.83 nm southeast of Tanjung Ramunia, Malaysia, sailed to Pulau Lima when the Chief Officer activated the SSAS and alerted other vessels anchored in the vicinity. The robbers fled when seeing an MMEA patrol boat approaching *Moresby 9*.

15. Timely reporting of incidents to the ReCAAP ISC by owners of tanker, *Ai Maru* and chemical tanker, *Zafirah* enable the ReCAAP ISC to alert the enforcement agencies who intercepted and dispatched their assets to the location of the incidents. In the incident involving *Zafirah*, the Vietnamese Marine Police and relevant agencies dispatched two patrol boats to the location, boarded the tanker and apprehended the 11 pirates onboard.



16. In the incident involving *Ai Maru*, a Honduras registered product tanker while underway at approximately 30nm off Horsburgh Lighthouse, South China Sea in 2012, six pirates boarded the tanker from two wooden speed boats. The pirates took control of the vessel, and the Chief Officer managed to contact the sister ship *Naniwa Maru* who informed the owner, in turn reported the incident to the ReCAAP ISC. In response, the regional authorities dispatched their assets to the location. The pirates escaped without siphoning the MGO when noticed a small aircraft flown overhead in the vicinity.

17. For a second time, *Ai Maru* was boarded again in the South China Sea on 14 Jun 2014. The timely reporting by the ship owner enabled the ReCAAP ISC to alert the Focal Point of Singapore, the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and the enforcement agency (Republic of Singapore Navy) as well as the maritime authorities from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia who responded to the incident by deploying their assets to the location of the incident. Although the authorities were close to arrest the pirates, this incident demonstrated the cooperative mechanism of the littoral States in information sharing and close operational cooperation in responding to transnational maritime incidents.

18. As for the incident involving *New Glory* on 25 May 14, it was a case of the perpetrators had the wrong information of the type of cargo carried onboard the tanker. The perpetrators left the tanker after discovering that the cargo onboard was asphalt instead of diesel.

Observations

19. Several observations from the series of incidents reported between 2011 and Jul 2014 are as follows:

- a. Demand for fuel/oil remains high and pirates/robbers are likely to continue with this lucrative business unless governments and shipping industry can work together collectively to arrest the perpetrators to serve as a deterrence;
- b. Pirates/robbers appeared to have knowledge of the amount and types of fuel/oil carried onboard the tankers and the route taken by the tankers;
- c. The possibility of conspiracy between two tankers as evident in the incident involving *Scorpio* and *Sea Jade*, which was later foiled had it not for the presence of MMEA patrol boat in the vicinity;



d. The possibility of conspiracy between the pirates/robbers and the master and crew of the victim tanker as in the case of *Naniwa Maru No. 1* where the master together with Chief Officer and Chief Engineer left the tanker with the robbers, bringing along their personal belongings and travel documents. The crew was initially alleged to be kidnapped were deemed otherwise following investigation by local authorities.

Recommendations

20. The ReCAAP ISC recommends the following:

Ship owner

- a. Be apprised of the latest situation and brief the crew during planning and prior to commencement of voyage;
- b. Ensure the crew know the ship's security plan
- c. Conduct regular background check of crew, and if need to, aware of the crew's activities onboard the ship and ashore;
- d. Ensure regular communication checks with the master (at least an interval of every four hourly or less)
- e. Compartmentalize information on a 'need-to-know' basis, particularly the type and volume of the fuel/oil the ship is carrying and the port to unload the cargo, if possible
- f. Replace the master and crew with new ones in the event that the same person or group of crew was involved in previous piracy or armed robbery incidents, if possible;

Ship master

- g. Adopt best practices in anti-piracy efforts and relevant elements of BMP4.
- h. Maintain all around vigilance while transiting locations with reports of piracy and armed robbery incidents and if possible, to plan an alternate voyage;
- i. Report promptly all incidents to the nearest coastal state and to have in place the list of authorities to contact in the event of any eventualities;



Ship Security Officer

- j. Conduct random inspection and check on crew and vessels prior leaving ports;
- k. Update master and crew of the latest situation, procedures of reporting including who to report to, and precautionary measures to take.

Authorities

- l. Conduct regular monitoring and patrols in locations of concern with deployment of patrol ships to serve as deterrence;
 - m. Establish a composite special task force or group from the Navy, Maritime Police, Air Force and other maritime law enforcement agencies in conducting maritime patrol in these areas.
 - n. Maximize the utilization of intelligence operations in gathering information about suspected syndicates and their collaborators involved in piracy and armed robbery, establish a database that can be useful for future apprehension and prosecution.
 - o. Encourage ship owners and CSO to make timely reporting, sharing information and adopt appropriate countermeasures that proven useful.
21. The ReCAAP ISC notes that vigilance and readiness of the crew is still the best practice adopted against piracy and sea robbery, whatever form and type it may take.
24. There are evidence that mostly small tankers (1000-2000 GT) are targeted, and this would necessitate ship owners/agencies to safeguard operational information to those who “need to know” and have more stringent background checks on personnel who are deemed suspicious in wanting to have access to more information.
23. With the current siphoning incidents reported in the region, the ReCAAP ISC advocates shared responsibilities among all concerned entities which is key to effectively tackle with the problem collectively.

**Prepared by the ReCAAP ISC
24 July 2014**



Incidents involving siphoning of fuel/oil (successful and unsuccessful cases) during 2011-2014

Name	Date	Time	GT	Successful/Fuel Siphoned?	Good Practices
2011					
<i>Namse Bang Dzod</i>	15 Apr 11	1700 hrs	-	Yes (0.8 metric ton of diesel)	-
2012					
<i>Ai Maru</i>	5 Jun 12	1124 hrs	1007	NO	Small aircraft flown by Indonesian Navy, causing pirates to escape
<i>Scorpio</i>	13 Sep 12	2300 hrs	1861	Detained (750 ton of fuel oil)	MMEA patrol boat in the vicinity, causing robbers to escape Detained <i>Scorpio</i> and <i>Sea Jade</i> for investigation
<i>Yunita</i>	11 Nov 12	0200 hrs	1893	Yes (80 metric ton of MGO)	-
<i>Zafirah</i>	19 Nov 12	1641 hrs	496	NO	Coordination and cooperation among VMP, VPN, Vietnam MSIC and Vietnam MRCC that led to apprehension of pirates
2013					
<i>Moresby 9</i>	17 Aug 13	2045 hrs	1321	NO	Chief Officer activated SSAS; one crew alerted vessels nearby via radio MMEA patrol boat rendered assistance, causing robbers to escape
<i>Danai 4</i>	10 Oct 13	0530 hrs	964	Yes (1,690 metric ton of MGO)	-
<i>GPT 21</i>	7 Nov 13	0330 hrs	1981	Yes (amount siphoned not reported)	-
2014					
<i>Sri Phangnga</i>	17 Apr 14	2010 hrs	929	Yes (400 metric ton of MGO)	-
<i>Naniwa Maru No. 1</i>	22 Apr 14	0055 hrs	3238	Yes (2,500 metric ton of MDO)	MMEA boarded vessel for investigation MMEA working with IMP
<i>New Glory</i>	25 May 14	2010 hrs	4268	NO	Asphalt instead of diesel was onboard
<i>Orapin 4</i>	28 May 14	0205 hrs	1924	Yes (3,200 metric ton of ADF)	-
<i>Budi Mesra Dua</i>	7 Jun 14	2345 hrs	5153	Yes (940 metric ton of diesel)	-
<i>Ai Maru</i>	14 Jun 14	2030 hrs	1007	Yes (620 metric ton of MGO)	Six vessels deployed by MMEA, RMN, TNI-AL & RSN, causing pirates to escape
<i>Moresby 9</i>	4 Jul 14	1938 hrs	1321	Yes (2118 metric ton of MGO)	Indonesian Navy reportedly deployed their ships to the location of incident. However, they were not able to locate <i>Moresby 9</i> .
<i>Oriental Glory</i>	15 Jul 14	2345 hrs	2223	Yes (1600 metric ton of MFO)	RMN ship <i>KD Trengganu</i> arrived at location and boarded the vessel. Indonesian Navy also reportedly deployed their assets in response to the incident.



Annex B

Estimated Quantity Lost from Siphoning of fuel/oil during 2011-2014


Name of vessel	Date	Quantity of fuel siphoned	Type of fuel siphoned
2011			
<i>Namse Bang Dzod</i>	15 Apr 2011	0.8 metric ton	Diesel
2012			
<i>Yunita</i>	11 Nov 2012	750 ton	Fuel oil
2013			
<i>Danai 4</i>	10 Oct 13	1690 metric ton	MGO
<i>GPT 21</i>	7 Nov 13	Not stated	MGO
2014			
<i>Sri Phangnga</i>	17 Apr 14	400 metric ton	MGO
<i>Naniwa Maru No. 1</i>	22 Apr 14	2500 metric ton	MDO
<i>Orapin 4</i>	28 May 14	3200 metric ton	ADF
<i>Budi Mesra Dua</i>	7 Jun 14	940 metric ton	Diesel
<i>Ai Maru</i>	14 Jun 14	620 metric ton	MGO
<i>Moresby 9</i>	4 Jul 14	2118 metric ton	MGO
<i>Oriental Glory</i>	15 Jul 14	1600 metric ton	MFO



Annex C

Incidents of Siphoning of fuel/oil during 2014

Incident involving *Sri Phangnga*



On 17 Apr 14 at or about 2010 hrs (local time), Thailand-registered oil tanker, *Sri Phangnga* was approximately 18 nm off Tanjung Sedili, Malaysia in the South China Sea when 16 pirates armed with a shotgun, a handgun and knives boarded the ship. The ship was forced to anchor and a small-sized tanker came alongside. About 450,000 litres of MGO was discharged from *Sri Phangnga*. The pirates escaped after taking the crew's personal belongings, ship equipment, destroyed the ship's communication power line and painted over the ship's name and company logo on the side of the tanker. The crew was not injured.



Foot prints of robbers



Siphoning in progress



Painting over ship's name



Cabin ransacked

Photographs courtesy of shipping company




Incident involving *Naniwa Maru No. 1*

Naniwa Maru No. 1




On 22 Apr 14 at or about 0100 hrs (local time), two vessels came alongside a Saint Kitts and Nevis-registered oil tanker, *Naniwa Maru No. 1* which was loaded with 4,344 metric tonnes of MGO near Port Klang, Malaysia. Five robbers boarded the ship, held the crew hostage while siphoned about 2,500 metric tonnes of

oil from the tanker, and escaped with the master, chief officer and chief engineer (all Indonesians) together with their personal belongings and travel documents. The other crew was safe. The Malaysian authorities are investigating the incident.



Incident involving *Orapin 4*


On 27 May 14 at or about 1500 hrs (local time), a Thailand-registered product tanker, *Orapin 4*, departed Singapore for Pontianak, Indonesia with 3,975 metric tonnes of Automotive Diesel Fuel (ADF) onboard. The vessel was scheduled to arrive in Pontianak on 29 May 14 at or about 1300 hrs (local time). However, on 28 May 14 at or about 1200 hrs (local time), the shipping company tried to contact *Orapin 4* via email but did not receive a reply. The tanker did not arrive in Pontianak on 29 May as scheduled. The company last contacted the tanker on 27 May 14 at or about 1730 hrs which was approximately 3.64 nm north of Pulau Batam, Indonesia. The last tracked position of *Orapin 4* on 27 May 14 at or about 2357 hrs was approximately 19.47 nm north of Pulau Bintan, Indonesia.



After losing communication with the master on 27 May 14, the owner reported the incident to the local authorities which is the ReCAAP Focal Point (Thailand). On 1 Jun 14, *Orapin 4* arrived at Sriracha Port, Chon Buri, Thailand at or about 1930 hrs (local time). All 14 Thai nationals and crew onboard was safe, and the master upon arrival reported the incident to the local police station. According to the master, at or about 0205 hrs (local time) on 28 May 14, 10 pirates armed with guns and knives boarded the tanker from a speed boat when the tanker was approximately 22.7 nm northeast of Pulau Bintan, Indonesia. The pirates repainted the ship name from *ORAPIN 4* to *RAPI*, and destroyed the communication equipment onboard, and cut off all communications. The pirates tied the crew and proceeded to the bridge to control the tanker. Another tanker came alongside and approximately 3,700 metric tonnes of ADF was siphoned from *Orapin 4*. The pirates took about 10 hours in siphoning before leaving the tanker and crew with enough fuel to sail back to shore.



Incident involving *Budi Mesra Dua*




On 7 Jun at or about 2330 hrs (local time), six pirates armed with knives and swords boarded the Malaysia-registered product tanker, *Budi Mesra Dua* from a high speed wooden boat when she was underway at approximately 70 nm off Bintulu, East Malaysia in the South China Sea. The pirates tied and locked the crew in the mess room; and forced the master and Chief Officer to steer the vessel to another location. Later, an unknown barge came

alongside *Budi Mesra Dua* and another 20 pirates boarded the vessel. The pirates siphoned 940 metric tonnes of diesel oil from *Budi Mesra Dua* to the barge. The pirates then ordered the master to sail towards Labuan and they escaped in a grey wooden boat on 8 Jun at or about 0911 hrs (local time). The pirates also stole cash and property such as laptops, camera, mobile phones, watch etc.; and also damaged navigation and communication equipment. A police report was lodged.



Incident involving *Ai Maru*



On 14 Jun 14, the shipping company reported to the ReCAAP ISC that an unknown number of pirates had boarded the Honduras-registered product tanker, *Ai Maru* from three speed boats in the South China Sea at or about 2030 hrs (local time). *Ai Maru* had departed western Singapore OPL for the Gulf of Thailand with 1520 metric tonne of MGO onboard. On receipt of the information, the ReCAAP ISC immediately worked with the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and alerted the regional maritime

authorities in the area. Whilst the vessel continued to head south-easterly at a speed of about 4.5 knots, the maritime authorities from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia responded to the incident and deployed their assets to the location.

A total of six vessels from the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN), Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) were deployed. At or about 0050 hrs (local time), *Ai Maru* was observed to be drifting with its shipboard lighting turned on, as the maritime authorities closed in. Investigation later revealed that seven pirates armed with pistols and knives boarded the product tanker, tied the crew and locked them in a room. They damaged the ship's communication equipment and stole the crew's personal belongings including laptops, cash and mobile phones; and fled after seeing the enforcement agencies' vessels pursuing. The pirates only managed to escape with 620 metric ton of MGO (which was 40% of the total cargo onboard), an amount they would not make off with, if not because of the presence of the authorities.




View of *Ai Maru* from RSS Gallant
(Photograph courtesy of RSN)



MMEA vessel beside *Ai Maru*
(Photograph courtesy of MMEA)



Incident involving *Moresby 9*




On 4 Jul 14, the shipping company reported to the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) that a Honduras registered product tanker *Moresby 9*, GT 1321 carrying 2200 metric tonne of MGO was boarded by unknown number of perpetrators at or about 1938 hrs (local time) at 03° 23.32' N, 105° 08.90' E (approximately 34 nm from the Indonesian Anambas Islands). The IFC alerted the regional navies and enforcement agencies. The ReCAAP ISC immediately worked with the IFC and alerted the regional maritime authorities in the area, including the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) who

responded that their assets were on standby nevertheless, noting that the location of boarding was not within their territorial waters. The Indonesian Navy reportedly deployed their ships to the location of the incident. However, they were not able to locate *Morseby 9* off Anambas. The last known position of *Moresby 9* was at 03° 22.21' N, 105° 08.09' E (approximately 36 nm from Anambas islands).

On 5 Jul 14, the shipping company managed to establish communications with *Moresby 9* and instructed her to anchor at 01° 20' N, 104° 19.3' E (approximately 3.9 nm southeast of Tanjung Ramunia, Johor). MMEA vessel, *KM TEGAS* boarded the tanker to conduct an inspection and interview of the crew. MMEA informed that on 4 Jul 14 at 0430 hrs, *Moresby 9* departed for Hong Kong after loading 2135 metric tons of Marine Gas Oil (MGO). On the same day, at or about 2015 hrs while the tanker was underway at position 03° 45.93' N, 105° 10.24' E (approximately 48.6 nm northwest of Pulau Anambas), an unmarked vessel came alongside *Moresby 9*. The crew heard a gunshot and suddenly nine robbers armed with machetes and three pistols were sighted on the deck of *Moresby 9*. Two more shots were fired. The perpetrators gathered the crew at the STBD bridge wing, tied and locked them in the engine control room except the Chief Officer who was detained at the bridge for navigation purposes. At about 2140 hrs, the tanker was forced to anchor at position 03° 35.81' N, 105° 12.53' E (approximately 39.4 nm northwest of Pulau Anambas) and her engines were turned off. At this point, the Chief Officer who was at the bridge allegedly noticed an approx 3000 GT orange motor tanker came alongside *Moresby 9* and siphoned off 2118 metric tons to the orange motor tanker between 2200 hrs on 4 Jul 14 till 0400 hrs on 5 Jul 14. This was discovered by the crew later, when some of the crew managed to get out from the engine control room through funnel.



Incident involving *Oriental Glory*



On 16 Jul 14, the shipping company reported to the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) that they had lost communications with their Malaysia-registered product tanker, *Oriental Glory*, which was carrying 2,500 metric tonnes of marine fuel oil. The company received a security alert from the vessel at 0551 hrs (local time) on the same day. The company then tried to communicate with the vessel but was unsuccessful. On 16 Jul 14 at or about 1300 hrs (local time), Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) vessel *KD Trengganu* arrived at the

location of the incident and boarded *Oriental Glory* for investigation. It was also reported that the Indonesian Navy also deployed their asset in response to the incident.

Initial investigation has revealed that robbers boarded *Oriental Glory* on 15 Jul 14 at or about 2345 hrs (local time) when she was anchored at approximately 44.5 nm northeast of Pulau Bintan, Indonesia in the South China Sea (01° 44.01' N, 105° 07.66' E). The robbers siphoned 1,600 metric tonnes of marine fuel oil from *Oriental Glory*; and stole cash and personal belongings of the crew, including watch, laptop and perfumes. The robbers also damaged the anchor windlass and other machineries. The robbers subsequently left the vessel on 16 Jul 14 at or about 0350 hrs (local time).

